Change the Regime – Change the Money: Bulgarian Banknotes, 1885-2001

The money we use has symbols and images on it that communicate information. One part of this are pictorial and symbolic elements that draw attention to aspects of the country that issuer is proud of and that convey the message that it wishes to convey. As one would expect, as regimes change, so do the banknotes. Bulgaria has a rich history of change having gone from being a (nominally) Ottoman principality to an independent Kingdom, an agrarian socialist state, a quasi-fascist Monarchy, a People’s Republic, and most recently, a Parliamentary Republic.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39894/3/wp509.pd

Change the Regime – Change the Money: Bulgarian Banknotes, 1885-2001

The money we use has symbols and images on it that communicate information. One part of this are pictorial and symbolic elements that draw attention to aspects of the country that issuer is proud of and that convey the message that it wishes to convey. As one would expect, as regimes change, so do the banknotes. Bulgaria has a rich history of change having gone from being a (nominally) Ottoman principality to an independent Kingdom, an agrarian socialist state, a quasi-fascist Monarchy, a People’s Republic, and most recently, a Parliamentary Republic.banknotes, design, Bulgaria

The Key to Risk Management: Management

The Barings, Daiwa Bank and Sumitomo Corp. financial debacles in the mid-1990s suggest that management failures rather than misfortune, errors, or complexity are a major source of the risk of financial debacles. These errors are systematic and are a concommittant of the structure of trading and of human nature. Risk management systems must take these facts into account.

Entry and Survival: The Case of Foreign Banks in Norway

Banks have been engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI) for over 150 years. In doing so, they have had to deal with the problems of the liability of foreignness, generally without being able to depend on proprietary administrative or physical technology. Foreign direct investment in banking therefore provides many experiments in entry and survival in a comparable industry across countries and institutional environments. Within banking, the Norwegian case has a number of useful characteristics. First, there is a clear and recent starting point for the entry of foreign banks. Second, there is an interesting mix of entrants and abstainers, and entry strategies. Third, enough time has elapsed that one can start to observe failures and survivors. In Section 2 I review the history of the Norwegian banking system and especially policies towards foreign banks. In brief, Norway has a long history of closure to foreign banks. In Section 3 I examine which foreign banks did or did not enter Norway when the government liberalized entry. The banks that entered had divergent firm-specific resources and followed divergent strategies. I pay particular attention to issues of the foreign banks' prior experience in Norway itself and the foreign banks' advantages vis-à-vis domestic banks. In Section 4 I investigate the correlates of survival and exit among the foreign bank entrants. Survival factors include prior experience in Norway, the size of the entrant at start-up, and the size of the parent. Lastly, Section 6 is a summary and conclusion.

Who Owns the Major US Subsidiaries of Foreign Banks? A Note

In 2000 ten foreign banks owned the 12 largest US subsidiaries of foreign banks, which account for over 92% of the assets of all subsidiaries. The parent banks were large and tended to be from English-speaking countries. The novel result is that the parent was often the largest bank in its home country, which suggests that domestic limits to growth are a factor in the foreign direct investment decision.foreign banks, subsidiaries, FDI, resource-based view

Foreign Banks in the Pacific: Some History and Policy Issues

Foreign banks now dominate retail banking in the territories, commonwealths, and nations of the Pacific Islands. Generally, banking is highly concentrated, with two Australian banks dominating the Australian sphere of influence, and three French banks dominating the French sphere. The situation in the U.S. sphere is a little more diverse, though in all three spheres there are situations of monopoly. The foreign banks have certain desirable attributes but also limitations. Locally-owned banks have complementary strengths, but also over-riding weaknesses. Government-owned banks have had a particularly unsuccessful history as political lending has frequently led to the banks’ failure. On balance, banking in the region calls out for innovative responses.foreign banks, Pacific islands, bank failure

Internationalization and the Rearrangement of Ownership of Firms and Parts of Firms: Grindlays Bank, 1828-2000

Grindlays Bank, a British overseas bank whose operations spanned South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, has a particularly long and rich history. As a multi-unit organization, Grindlays provides a good example of the point that if one wishes to understand the internationalization process of such a firm — the mechanisms that determine the geographical scope of its operations — one must take into account the rearrangement of ownership of units (primarily branches). As Grindlays’ strategy changed, frequently as a function of changes in its ownership, Grindlays responded by buying or selling units. It also lost units to actions of governments. However, it is the rearrangement of ownership of branches that is the most provocative observation in that it suggests the hypothesis that strategic advantage in banks does not reside at the branch level.foreign direct investment,

Foreign banks in Bulgaria, 1875-2002

We use the analogy of ecological succession as our conceptual framework. We apply this analogy to the history of foreign banks in Bulgaria and argue that the current predominance of foreign banks is unlikely to be permanent, even without government action. Foreign banks have entered Bulgaria several times—before World War I, again after that war, and after the fall of Communism in the early 1990s. The same source countries and even some of the same banks that were present before World War II or even World War I, reappear in the 1990s. Government concern with retaining control over credit limited the foreigners’ role in the banking system. However, since 1997 the government has privatized almost all the major banks with the result that foreign banks now control over 80 per cent of the banking system’s assets.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39922/3/wp537.pd

Foreign banks in Bulgaria, 1875-2002

We use the analogy of ecological succession as our conceptual framework. We apply this analogy to the history of foreign banks in Bulgaria and argue that the current predominance of foreign banks is unlikely to be permanent, even without government action. Foreign banks have entered Bulgaria several times—before World War I, again after that war, and after the fall of Communism in the early 1990s. The same source countries and even some of the same banks that were present before World War II or even World War I, reappear in the 1990s. Government concern with retaining control over credit limited the foreigners’ role in the banking system. However, since 1997 the government has privatized almost all the major banks with the result that foreign banks now control over 80 per cent of the banking system’s assets.International-banking, Bulgaria, Foreign-Banks, transition, succession

Problems of Bank Lending in Bulgaria: Information Asymmetry and Institutional Learning

Why are there such severe problems in lending in the transition countries? This research took a microeconomic and institutional look at part of the problem. We conducted interviews in Bulgaria and Hungary and sought answers to two questions. First, how do banks making "normal" loans insure that they were making "good" loans? Second, how do banks get their money back on loans that have turned bad? Clearly, weaknesses at either stage could explain both past loan failures and present reluctance to lend. The bankers we spoke to reported significant difficulties at both stages of the credit process. First, the bankers reported difficulties in accumulating the information to evaluate borrowers and their projects. The bankers also reported problems with encouraging borrowers to repay and difficulties with seizing collateral, and using legal action in collecting bad debts. Although many of the problems are universal problems of bank lending, many seemed specific to transition economies in general and Bulgaria in particular. We identified specific problems with obtaining and using the evidence about borrowers that might have been available. Bulgarian bankers were often less than fully effective in collecting all available information, or in considering later how they could improve their methods of evaluating clients. One method that more banks might usefully adopt is systematic review of loan losses and the incorporation of lessons learned into the training of new loan officers. In addition, there were serious difficulties in sharing information about borrowers among bankers and between bankers and other firms. Some relaxation of bank secrecy would be appropriate. We also identified policy areas where improvement appears appropriate. Reputation can be effective in ensuring that borrowers fulfill their contracts. However, there is a general lack of credit reporting institutions to share information about credit-worthiness; this need to be remedied. The heavy reliance on collateral imposes high costs on borrowers and lenders. For collateral to work properly, banks must be able to perfect the collateral and to dispose of it quickly. Finally, fraud against banks was common, but typically went unpunished; prosecutors were apparently not interested in such cases. Bankers and prosecutors must make the prosecution of bank fraud a priority. We base our findings on the 24 banking interviews we conducted in Bulgaria. We also conducted 12 interviews in Hungary. Bankers were surprisingly candid in describing most of their problems.